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The debate on the Wissenschaftsrat-Report has quickly turned into one about
the comparative advantages of German doctrinal vs. US interdisciplinary legal
scholarship and education. This is not surprising because much of the Report reads
like a recommendation to go further down the American path, while at the same time
still taking doctrine seriously – very seriously indeed. In taking this ‘middle path’, the
authors seek to take the best of what are two very different academic worlds. This
effort is admirable, but I am skeptical about its prospects.
The attempt itself stems, I think, from a deeper dilemma that has haunted German-
American debates for a while and has been discussed by Or Bassok on the ICON-
Blog: While American scholars are interested in ‘external’ forces that drive law,
their scholarship can easily become destructive, as Joseph Weiler mentioned at a
recent German-American NYU workshop. Ulrich Haltern and Christoph Möllers have
addressed this problem as the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ of American legal realism: that
it destroys trust in law by exposing it as driven by external, non-legal forces. That the
US Bar Association is now increasingly protesting the American approach is hence
hardly accidental (see Ralf Michael’s posting). The challenge, as many Germans
and some American scholars see it, is how to avoid this destruction. Interdisciplinary
research, in other words, is only good so long as it is useful to make normative and
ultimately legal claims.
This task, however, is not only very difficult, but it also comes with a price to pay.
This price is an increased risk of being considered unprofessional for dabbling in a
field not your own and of being wrong.
These risks are perhaps lowest for interdisciplinary work involving ethics or political
philosophy. Legal terms often refer to ethical and political concepts and it is therefore
comparatively easy to frame them as legal arguments. There is little translation work
that has to be done and therefore less of a risk to get things entirely wrong. Because
this kind of argument also has a long historical pedigree, lawyers with this kind of
approach are less likely to be considered unprofessional. This is, I think, the reason
why most existing German interdisciplinary legal work builds on philosophy.
Things become quickly more difficult, however, with other disciplines whose
languages are more foreign to us as lawyers. Not only is translation more difficult
when we are dealing with descriptive rather than normative research in other fields.
There is also a bigger problem with professionalism. German legal culture places a
high emphasis on professional expertise that comes with a certain love for precision
and nuance. Or in other words: If American legal scholars try first to be interesting,
Germans want first to be right. It is because American try hard to be interesting that
many smart German law students who study in the US enjoy it so much, as Rob
Howse tells us. Conversely, however, the willingness and patience of many lawyers
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to engage in very nuanced arguments about comparatively small points of law often
makes Germans very good doctrinal scholars (see Ralf Michael’s posting).
For German legal scholars, this emphasis on being right quickly becomes a problem
for interdisciplinary research. German lawyers are not trained in other disciplines.
Dabbling with some fascinating research in other fields therefore always carries high
risks of both being and seeming unprofessional: We might not understand things
well enough and make mistakes. And in our Weberian culture with its emphasis
on expertise, being unprofessional is the ultimate sin. This Weberian culture is, of
course, not frozen in time, as Howse rightly points out. Nevertheless, it is also not
something we can change with a mere report. American legal scholars are better
equipped to deal with interdisciplinary questions because they are more exposed
to other disciplines in law school and study other subjects at college. They are
also more willing to take risks, to not be constructive or precise as long as they say
something original and interesting because their professional integrity is less likely
to be questioned for it. German scholars faced with social science research in turn
often behave much like turtles when danger approaches: they withdraw back into
their legal shell.
If we therefore really want German scholars to do more interdisciplinary work, we
need to be less afraid of making mistakes because we are drawing on fields we are
not professionally trained in and we need to be more forgiving towards those who
do. Similarly, if we want to hire foreigners at German law schools, we have to accept
that this may mean that we can offer less in-depth education on the finer doctrinal
points of German law to German law students preparing for state exams. Finally,
if we want German scholars to engage in debates in English with their American
and other international colleagues – as the Report does – it will not be enough to
translate German texts into English. German scholars will also have to adopt a less
technical writing style that may sometimes look unscientific to a more traditional
German audience. This, I think, is well worth the price. But I suspect it is not one that
many Germans legal professionals will be willing to pay.
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